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Background note on pastoralism 




The consequences of future global climate variability for pastoralists are uncertain. 
The general picture is one of likely desiccation – of a decrease in the amount and 
predictability of rainfall, combined with an increase in evaporation caused by the 
warmer temperatures. One estimate is that, on present trends, the area affected by 
drought will double by the end of this century from 25% to 50%, and that while the 
number of drought periods may not significantly increase, they are likely to last for 
longer, making recovery (herd reconstitution, replenishment of water sources) less 
dependable.
1 This scenario is consistent with recent trends: the mean annual number 
of people killed and affected by drought in Eastern Africa, for example, has increased 




However, these are global projections. The picture at a local level is far less clear and 
likely to be mixed. Rainfall is the most important climatic influence on African 
agriculture. For pastoralists it determines the distribution, amount, and quality of 
pasture. The IPCC’s report in 2001 noted that scenarios for Sahelian summer rainfall 
vary by as much as +/- 20%. Some analysts argue that the Sahel will continue to dry 
out as East Africa becomes wetter;
3 others argue that a temporary ‘greening’ of the 
Sahel is plausible due to increased rainfall over the coming decades, but that this is 
likely to be reversed by the end of the century.
4 Thus, the importance of understanding 
and adapting to global climate change at the local level is clear. 
 
Pastoralism is by its very nature a form of adaptation to climate change, which has 
been demonstrated over millennia. Pastoralism in Africa evolved in response to long-
term climate variability. The Sahara entered a period of prolonged desiccation 
approximately 7000 years ago. With no reliable supplies of permanent water (away 
from the rivers Nile and Niger), pastoralism enabled people to adapt to an 
increasingly arid and unpredictable environment by moving livestock according to the 
shifting availability of water and pasture.
5 
 
Several thousand years later, at the end of the nineteenth century, Eastern Africa 
experienced a period of unprecedented ecological and environmental collapse. The 
advent of previously unknown epizootic diseases such as rinderpest killed large 
numbers of cattle, but herds had largely recovered by World War One. Pre-colonial 
pastoralist communities in East Africa were not isolated entities but part of complex 
networks that tied together complementary economies and ecologies.
6 Farmers and 
hunter-gatherers joined Maasai age-sets; stockless Maasai and Turkana herders were 
temporarily integrated within neighbouring hunting, fishing, or farming communities, 
                                                            
1 Hadley Centre 2006. 
2 Guha-Sapir et al, 2004. The authors include several cautions about the reliability of disaster-related 
data. 
3 Hadley Centre 2006; Lorimer n.d., drawing on research by Held (2005). 
4 Brooks 2004 and 2006. See also Brahic 2006. 
5 Brooks 2006. 
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from where they could rebuild their herds and eventually return to the range.
7 These 
fluid social and economic ties and identities were important strategies through which 
all parties, including pastoralists, were able to manage various forms of risk, including 
climate variability. 
 
Pastoralists today apply similar principles of flexibility and opportunism in managing 
their environment. Mobility, herd stratification, livestock loans and gifts, 
diversification of species and livelihoods – all these are ways of spreading risk and 
making maximum use of natural resources that vary both temporally and spatially.
8 
Indeed, long-term research from Northern Kenya suggests that livestock keeping is 
more competitive than formal banking in terms of returns to capital.
9 However, in the 
intervening years pastoralists have experienced a dramatic decline in their political 
fortunes. One hundred years ago East Africa’s livestock keepers were at the centre of 
regional political economies in which wealth was defined by cattle. Fifty years later 
they found themselves on the periphery of economies driven not by livestock but by 
export agriculture, and ones which offered very different routes to accumulation.
10 
Human development involves the steady expansion of people’s choices and options, 
but for pastoralists the reverse has been true. Their options have been progressively 
closed off, at first by spatial barriers (the political and ethnic boundaries imposed by 
the colonial and post-colonial state) and then by the obstacles inherent in the 
development models those states have pursued. 
 
For most of the twentieth century, 
rangeland management in Africa 
followed a model imported from 
the temperate grasslands and 
equilibrium conditions of North 
America.
11 Its principles chimed 
well with the modern state’s 
desire for legibility, predictability, 
and order, and with its aspiration 
to tame the natural environment.
12 
But in Africa’s non-equilibrium 
drylands the model failed. 
Nevertheless, its dominance 
reinforced a view of pastoralism 
as irrational and outmoded. 
‘Despite overwhelming evidence 
to the contrary, many policy 
makers consider pastoralism to be 
archaic and economically 
irrational, and in need of 
modernisation or replacement. 
Such conclusions are based on a 
                                                            
7 Spear and Waller 1993; Broch-Due and Anderson 1999. 
8 Niamir-Fuller 1999; Galvin et al 2004. 
9 McPeak 2005. 
10 Waller and Sobania 1994. 
11 Scoones 2007. 
12 Scott 1998. 
Box 1: 
Learning to live with uncertainty 
Uncertainty is part of the new range ecology of Scoones, 
Benkhe, Kerven, et al, which developed during the 1990s. 
Their work demonstrated that the underlying assumptions 
of equilibrium range ecology (such as fixed carrying 
capacities) and consequent solutions (such as destocking) 
were inappropriate to many parts of Africa. The spatial 
distribution of livestock rather than their number is what 
must be managed to avoid overgrazing, thus highlighting 
the critical importance of mobility in dryland resource 
management. A more opportunistic approach to ecosystem 
management is essential in areas with high coefficients of 
variation in rainfall.  
 
If climate uncertainty is on the increase, so are non-
equilibrium conditions. Even in places where 
unpredictability has been the norm, this will have major 
implications for livelihood sustainability. However, 
equilibrium notions of control and predictability also 
infect development thinking. ‘Planners, managers, and 
policy makers, just as dryland farmers and pastoralists in 
Africa, must learn to live with uncertainty.’ 
 
[Scoones 2007, Davies/Hatfield 2006, Mortimore 2003] 
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narrow view of what constitutes value in pastoral systems.’
13 The consequences of the 
‘stickiness’ of this view are illustrated in the next section. 
 
The dominant sets of ideas through which policy-makers view the world, and the 
discourse they use to communicate these paradigms, define how issues are 
addressed.
14 If pastoralism is understood as backward and irrational, then the logical 
response will be to modernise it. In similar fashion, an alarmist narrative of ‘deserts 
on the move’ drove concerns about desertification since the 1930s and led in large 
part to the same top-down, technical ‘solutions’ which failed to engage with the actual 
experience of dryland farmers and pastoralists.
15 The global discourse on climate 
change must avoid falling into the same trap, and must make space for those directly 
affected, including pastoralists, to shape it. 
 
2. Constraints to adaptation 
 
Pastoral production has shown itself, both in practice and in theory, to be highly 
flexible, exploiting geographical niches and surviving decadal intervals of growth and 
contraction. This evidence notwithstanding, the ability of any group to cope with and 
respond to threats and challenges is critically linked to their access to resources 
(economic, ecological, social, and human)
16 and to the existence of supportive policies 
and institutions, both formal and informal. Furthermore it is overwhelmingly the poor 
who suffer from the impacts of natural disasters.
17 This axiom holds whether one 
considers risk to natural hazards such as drought, floods, and cyclones or more recent 
challenges such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The quality of drought management 
systems is thus one indicator of how well pastoralists are already equipped to manage 
shocks.  
 
Investing in drought management: a political choice 
Climate change is likely to increase the frequency and intensity of drought and floods 
in many arid and semi-arid environments. Pastoralists, in common with other affected 
groups, will need access to resources that help warn them of impending calamities, 
protect their livelihood assets, and increase their resilience. The level and nature of 
their exposure to hazard differs from fellow members of their national communities. 
Access to resources and opportunities is determined by social factors, including 
economic and political processes.
18 The lacklustre performance to date of 
governments and development agencies in supporting livelihoods and reducing 
poverty in arid and semi-arid environments, particularly in Africa, points to a very 
real concern that the ability of pastoral groups to both cope with and adapt to climate 
change will continue to be compromised. 
 
Where pastoral groups are stronger, and where governments invest more in drought 
preparedness, drought can be much more effectively managed. While Africa is not the 
most drought-exposed continent, it suffers most in terms of human and economic 
                                                            
13 Davies/Hatfield 2006. 
14 Stone et al 2001. 
15 Swift 1996. 
16 Huq et al 2006. 
17 UN/ISDR 2003. 
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losses.
19 Of course, as countries develop economically, the impacts of hydrological 
drought are mediated by the relatively small size of the agricultural sector compared 
with other productive sectors. However, even among relatively poor countries, there is 
a wide discrepancy in the degree to which governments have invested in developing 
and protecting livelihoods in drought-prone areas, or have rather relied on food aid as 
a safety net and social insurance mechanism. Failure to invest constitutes a political 
choice. It leads to a chronic weakening of pastoralists’ resource base, which in turn 
threatens health and well-being and undermines pastoralists’ capacity to pursue 
alternative futures, whether through education or through livelihood diversification. 
Investing in an effective drought management system, and in opportunities for income 
generation that are complementary to pastoral production and that promote alternative 
livelihoods, is more dependent on political will than on size of GDP. The governance 
dimensions of famine and drought have been central to a vital current within drought 
thinking since Sen’s work on famines and democracies, and they need to be invoked 
in thinking about the future of dryland communities.
20 
 
Pastoralists: passive victims of crisis or active agents of change? 
Since the 1990s, economic studies of pastoral production have shown it to be highly 
adaptable within time and space, and between two and ten times more productive than 
commercial ranching under the same conditions.
21 With secure rights to their lands, 
access to markets, and the space to make their own decisions, communities can make 
a successful living from semi-
arid lands, as studies in Kenya, 
Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal 
have shown (see Box 2). This is 
likely to be a far more cost-




Research shows that pastoral 
livelihoods are far from static. 
The experience of indigenous 
Arctic peoples maps out how 
pastoral production may change 
over time, as economic and 
social factors are affected by a 
mixture of endogenous and 
exogenous influences. These 
include an outward migration of 
skilled individuals, and deeper 
integration into national 
economies, particularly fishing 
and mineral economies. At the 
same time, traditional livelihoods such as hunting and fishing continue to be practised 
                                                            
19 www.droughtnet.org 
20 See, for example, Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 88, ‘Delivering the Agenda: Addressing Chronic 
Under-Development in Kenya’s Arid Lands’; Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 89, ‘Making the Case: A 
National Drought Contingency Fund for Kenya’; Batterbury/Warren 2001. 
21 Scoones 1995. 
22 The cost of the 1999-2000 drought in Kenya was estimated at $2.5bn. See UN/ISDR 2005. 
Box 2: 
The Machakos hypothesis. 
The ‘Machakos hypothesis’ refers to the proposition that 
‘under the right conditions there may be positive linkages 
between population growth, agricultural intensification 
and the improvement of livelihoods’ (Mortimore/Tiffen 
2004). It emerged from a study of long-term change (60 
years) in the semi-arid district of Machakos, Kenya, and 
its validity was subsequently endorsed by further long-
term studies in Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Makueni 
district, Kenya. Far from being necessarily constrained by 
the limitations of poor soil and unreliable rainfall, dryland 
farmers demonstrated significant capacity to adapt to 
change and respond to new opportunities when the overall 
policy environment enabled them to do so (such as 
improved access to markets and the right incentives to 
invest). The Machakos hypothesis challenges dominant 
neo-Malthusian paradigms concerning the link between 
population growth and environmental degradation. 
 
[Drawn from Mortimore 1998 and Mortimore/Tiffen 
2004] 
 Isobel Birch/Richard Grahn, final draft, May 2007  5
but with modern technologies and a mixture of traditional and modern regulatory 
systems.
23 These traditional practices still remain the basis of sustainable land-use 
systems that balance human and ecological needs. 
 
Importantly, a human-rights based approach to climate change is more advanced 
within Arctic societies than within African. In 2005, Inuit campaigners petitioned for 
a hearing on Arctic climate change within the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, a body of the Organisation of American States. The group will submit 
findings from studies including the 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, which 
concluded that the Arctic is extremely vulnerable to global warming and is now 
experiencing some of the most rapid changes on earth. The group argues that the 
deterioration in hunting conditions constitutes a violation of their right to practise a 
hunting-based lifestyle. 
 
In contrast, African pastoral societies have largely been portrayed as victims of global 
climate change. The peak of the 2005-06 drought which affected most pastoral areas 
in the Horn of Africa prompted one international NGO to conclude that Kenya’s 
pastoralists would be the sentinel population for global climate change – ‘climate 
canaries’.
24 This focus on the purported impacts of climate change on marginalised 
groups arguably lacks political sophistication. Pastoralists in the Horn and East Africa 
are generally poorly represented in their governments and lack genuine, organised 
civil society representation.
25 Equally, pastoral groups often do not have the means by 
which to communicate the message that in many places adaptability has enabled 
pastoral production to respond to climate variability on both an inter-annual and inter-
decadal scale. Nevertheless, in other places the options for pastoralists are being 
progressively closed down, as the following examples from Kenya and Sudan 
illustrate. 
 
Wajir District: the consequences of constraining mobility
26 
Wajir covers nearly 60,000km
2 of Kenya’s arid North Eastern Province. Its 
population is predominantly Somali, and primarily engaged in nomadic pastoralism, 
herding combinations of cows, camels, and shoats. Rainfall variability is high, and 
droughts are frequent.
27 The process of limiting mobility and flexibility began in the 
colonial era, when ethnic groups were allocated fixed grazing areas. These prevented 
pastoralists from exploiting variable natural resources, and created a firmer 
association between clan and territory which was contrary to the more fluid social ties 
of the pre-colonial era. 
 
Both the colonial and the post-colonial governments pursued a highly technical 
ranching model in Wajir. This was driven in part by fear: fear of over-grazing and 
degradation, and fear of livestock disease infiltrating white-owned ranches further 
south. New boreholes were drilled to service the grazing blocks, and these in turn led 
                                                            
23 Arctic Human Development Report 2004. 
24 Christian Aid 2006. 
25 A notable exception to this, the Kenya Pastoral Forum, gave rise to the Kenya Pastoral Parliamentary 
Group which ‘sent shockwaves through the political establishment’ and showed, perhaps, the potential 
of organised pastoralist representatives. Goldsmith, Perceptions of Pastoralism in Kenya, unpublished 
report. 
26 This section is based on Walker and Omar, 2004. 
27 Some of the most serious droughts since independence in 1963 have been in 1970, 1984, 1991, 2000, 
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to the emergence of new settlements (Box 3). More water points and settlements have 
a detrimental impact on pastoralists’ ability to manage the natural resource base 
effectively, and therefore on their capacity to withstand drought. 
 
Traditionally, areas of dry season and wet 
season grazing in Wajir were distinct. 
During the dry season livestock were 
grazed close to permanent water points. 
When the rains came, they moved to 
fresh grazing in wet season areas, where 
natural pans had by now filled, leaving 
dry season pastures to recover. Areas of 
reserve grazing were also important fall-
back resources. But since the 1970s this pattern has broken down. With more water 
points, most areas of the district can now be accessed all year round. The areas grazed 
only in the wet season have reduced, leading to fewer areas of fresh pasture following 
the rains, while the areas grazed in the dry season get no chance to recover; drought 
reserve areas have all but disappeared. As a result, pastoralists report an increase in 
stocking density, a reduction in palatable grass and browse, and a decline in milk 
production for all species. The consequence is that their ability to manage an 
uncertain environment, and therefore their resilience to drought, has decreased. 
 
However, the process of sedentarisation in Wajir is not linked solely to inappropriate 
development models; it also has political roots. With the advent of multi-partyism in 
1992, the positions of chief and sub-chief became a means of political reward; the 
loyal post-holders would in turn promise to deliver a block vote from their sub-clan. 
This led to a growing sub-division of the district administration. A sub-chief would 
settle in his new sub-location, invite members of his sub-clan to join them, and then 
pressure would increase for all the trappings that a settlement requires (borehole, 
school, clinic). A second political factor has been the new poverty-reduction funds 
channelled since 2003 not through line ministries but through constituencies and 
locations. These have created an incentive for people to settle closer to the centre of 
political power in their area in order to access these resources. But many of these new 
settlements have no permanent source of water, and are thus reliant on water 
tankering in the dry season. The government’s own technical officers – ironically now 
displaying more understanding of disequilibrium environments – have been unable to 
hold these trends in check. In the words of one government officer, ‘water tankering 
has become a response to a self-inflicted disaster’. 
 
Similar trends can be seen in Red Sea State (Box 4)
28 and in the Sahel, where the 
‘irreversible cycle of impoverishment’ of some pastoral communities is explained by 
a policy bias towards agriculture, decreasing security of tenure, and the impact of 
modern infrastructure (such as boreholes and cemented wells) which have weakened 
traditional systems of negotiation over access to key resources such as water points. 
‘These institutional and political pressures have sapped the capacity of pastoralists to 
adopt flexible coping strategies in the face of climatic fluctuations and other natural 
pressures but have won increasing official sanction.’
29 Scoones notes that in Southern 
Africa, contemporary droughts seem to have a much bigger impact than those of ten 
                                                            
28 Based on Pantuliano 2002. 
29 Thébaud 1998. 
Box 3: 
Settlements and major dry season water 
points in Wajir 
 
 Settlements  Water  points 
1940 4  4 
1996 45  24 
2002 71  40 
 Isobel Birch/Richard Grahn, final draft, May 2007  7
or twenty years ago, even though the degree of climatic disruption that triggers a food 
crisis is far smaller. His conclusion is that the long-term resilience of people’s 
livelihoods has been undermined.
30 
 
The Beja of Halaib Province, the Somali of Wajir District, and the shepherds of the 
Sahel have always lived with uncertainty, but the strategies they once used to manage 
this have been progressively undermined. In part this has been because external actors 
(governments, aid agencies, private investors) have failed to understand the complex 
relationship between pastoral systems and dryland environments. The systematic 
marginalisation of pastoral areas in Sudan, north and south, is acknowledged as one of 
the key drivers of the conflict in the south and the latent conflict in the east of the 
country.
31 In places such as these, pastoralists have already been pushed to the limit. 
‘Business as usual’ strategies of allowing food aid to fill the gaps of under-investment 
are not viable options, either for pastoralists or for their governments. However, 
national political factors and dynamics have also played their part; in some cases 
pastoral elites have deliberately chosen an alternative and highly unsustainable 
development path, for which the political system has rewarded them.  
 
 
                                                            
30 Scoones 2007. 
31 Flint/de Waal 2005. 
Box 4: 
Growing vulnerability to drought in Halaib, Red Sea State, Sudan  
‘Increased vulnerability to drought and other external shocks is what characterises the 
evolution of the Beja livelihood system throughout the second half of the twentieth century.’ 
 
Halaib is the most northern of the four provinces that make up Red Sea State in north 
eastern Sudan. The Beja pastoralists that inhabit the area used to have multiple strategies to 
cope with the variability of their ecosystem, but the resilience of these has declined over the 
past century as a result of several factors. 
 
First, the Turko-Egyptian administration introduced commercial agricultural schemes on 
grazing land. These were expanded by the British, who allowed strategic drought reserve 
areas in the Gash Delta to be used for the production of cotton and other crops. Second, the 
imposition of a hierarchical administrative system was at odds with the flexibility of 
traditional leadership; it also created an artificial ruling elite that was ill-equipped to defend 
the interests of the Beja. Third, the government’s bias towards settled agriculture led to a 
focus on ‘modern’ systems of livestock husbandry, such as livestock development centres and 
dairy farms, rather than investment in mobile pastoralism. Fourth, the ‘pull’ factor of paid 
work in Port Sudan reduced the availability of male labour within pastoral households. And 
finally, relief programmes concentrated aid in settlements and diverted labour into food for 
work schemes – most of which were focused on fixed structures or agriculture, and therefore 
of less relevance to pastoralists. 
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3. Conclusions 
 
So what are the policy options for addressing climate change within the arid and semi-
arid environments of the world? On the basis of the above, strategies would logically 
be underpinned by a commitment to strengthen pastoralists’ existing adaptive 
capacities, and to put in place the kind of enabling environment within which they can 
exercise them. Policy-makers need to avoid reifying pastoralism and therefore stifling 
its ability to innovate and change. A commitment to enhance pastoralists’ mobility is 
critical – for example by protecting migration routes and facilitating cross-border 
migration.
32 Diversification into other rural livelihoods is also important and must be 
underpinned by investments in enabling infrastructures – roads, rail links, and 
livestock marketing routes. Climate change and the global carbon market offer 
potential opportunities for pastoral groups. In Shinyanga region of Tanzania, agro-
pastoralists have reforested 250,000 hectares of degraded land.
33 Capping slaughter 
houses and other facilities can reduce methane emissions and provide valuable 
certified reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. More broadly, changes in 
conservation and wildlife policies are needed to enable pastoralists to benefit more 
from the minimal impacts their lifestyle has on biodiversity and wildlife that has a 
global environmental intrinsic and commercial value.
34 
 
In essence, climate change need not entirely be a narrative of loss. Pastoralists should 
be well placed to exploit increasingly erratic rainfall – it is what they have been doing 
for years. They might even expand their migration range: as mentioned at the 
beginning of this paper, one scenario for the Sahel in the short- to medium-term is an 
increase in rainfall and a greening of presently arid areas. Provided we can get the 
global architecture right, payment for environmental services such as the protection of 
biodiversity and carbon sequestration become lucrative supplements to pastoral 
production. But all of this, of course, depends on pastoralists’ leaders, representatives, 
and governments being able to exploit the opportunities that are offered. Pastoralists 
are not yet part of the debate on adaptation to climate change, in the same way that 
they are not part of other policy processes. Too often adaptation is assumed. 
Adaptation flows risk favouring those already better equipped to take advantage of 
them, such as sedentarised and politically influential groups. The result would be to 
maintain or even exacerbate existing social and economic inequalities. 
 
Whatever the predictions of global climate change may be, the one certainty is that 
the future will be less predictable. Pastoralism is a system that by its nature can adapt 
to unpredictability, but only if pastoralists have the physical and political space within 
which to do so. 
                                                            
32 Davies/Hatfield 2006. 
33 Barrow/Mlenge 2003. 
34 See DFID’s Wildlife and Poverty Study, December 2002. Elliot, J., Grahn, R., Sriskanthan, G., 
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